The writings of L. T. Hobhouse (1864-1929) pose a far-reaching challenge to many social and political ideas which were at once influential and questionable. Regrettably, quite a few of these ideas are still circulating today because, in part, Hobhouse has fallen out of academic fashion. Instead of pointing to new ways of thinking, his arguments have been largely ignored. But let’s look back on some of his key contributions and reconnect with their implications for contemporary debates.
To begin with, in works such as The Theory of Knowledge and The Rational Good, Hobhouse confronted the damaging dichotomy that insists we must either find some absolute belief system that no one can conceivably reject, or accept that there is no objective basis for identifying any particular claim as true. Hobhouse argued that hypotheses, experiments, observations, gathered evidence, would cohere around particular interpretations or clash with each other. If the former, increasing harmony of those elements would add to the reliability of the claim in question. If the latter, the clashing would suggest that further examination is required. Knowledge is thus obtainable, if provisional. We do not have to act as though any claim (theory, report, judgement) is ‘as good as’ any other. But we must remain open-minded about future revisions when new ideas and evidence emerge.
With an objective epistemological basis established, Hobhouse challenged the pseudo-Darwinian ideas that supposed ‘survival of the fittest’ meant that any form of life coming through evolutionary changes must be ‘superior’ to what existed before. He remarked that in biological terms, different living things emerged through evolution, and while they had diverse habitats and behavioural patterns, none could be said to be inherently ‘superior’ to any other. Furthermore, if ‘superior’ is to be taken in moral terms, then a theory of value is needed to distinguish intentional behaviour that is commendable from that which is contemptible. It follows then that societal changes do not necessarily produce ‘winners’ who are morally praiseworthy, or ‘losers’ who merit neglect. On the contrary, in books such as Social Development: its nature and conditions, and Democracy and Reaction, Hobhouse explained how moral progress related to the improvement of human relationships, and the activities of warring imperialists, racist conquerors, and economic oppressors should accordingly be censured and countered.
Building on his ideas on harmony and cooperation in attaining epistemological and moral progress, Hobhouse set out a theory of social development which explains how people throughout history would go through three stages of interpersonal governance (see, e.g., Morals in Evolution, and Social Evolution and Political Theory). The first stage is that of kinship where family and tribal links provide familiarity, trust, and shared customs to hold groups together. Then came rule by authority where the power obtained by a few enable them to command compliance from larger, disparate groups. Finally, there is the model of citizenship, which operates through democratic self-rule with diverse and equal citizens sharing power in shaping the laws that govern them all. Hobhouse stressed that there was a moral case to seek progress towards the model of citizenship, but warned that anti-progressive forces could push societies into fragmented inward looking groups or towards subjugation by new forms of authoritarianism. Progress is desirable but not guaranteed.
Having argued for making progress towards a more cooperative society structured around democratic citizenship, Hobhouse took aim at prevailing notions of the state and put forward an alternative goal for political action. In Liberalism, he challenged the assumption that a liberal state should leave people to behave without constraint so that the fittest would survive. He pointed out that those fittest in hurting, threatening, oppressing others might not be fit at all to have power over others in society. Instead, the state should not only prevent individuals from intimidating or exploiting others, but also tackle the systemic disadvantages some people have been burdened with. Furthermore, public policies could support research, education, and collaboration to help citizens achieve more than they could on their own. At the same time, Hobhouse was critical of the idealisation of the state that was popular with Hegelian academics and authoritarian politicians. In The Metaphysical Theory of the State: a criticism, he rejected the idea that the state could by itself embody some higher purpose which it was then entitled to pursue regardless of what citizens think. For Hobhouse, the state exists to serve the public, and its legitimacy rests on citizens’ own assessment of its actions. Ultimately, the state must be held in check through democratic accountability.
It is not uncommon to hear these days that there is no coherent philosophy to guide social and political reflections. Between ‘anything goes’ relativism and parochial dogmatism, there is no path for reasoned consensus or informed cooperation. But Hobhouse gave us many insightful pointers a century ago. We would do well to revisit them and take up his challenge to map out a route towards a more thoughtful and inclusive society.
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